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Post-Trial Plea Bargaining and 
Predictive Analytics in Public Law 
Harold J. Krent* 
Abstract 
Adam Gershowitz’s article calling for post-trial plea 
bargaining in capital cases reasons that governors should 
commute sentences to life in prison, in exceptional cases, to limit 
the costs of protracted post-trial litigation over imposition of the 
death penalty. The commutation power, in his view, resembles 
pre-trial plea bargaining in that both the state and the criminal 
defendant can benefit—the state saves resources while the 
defendant gets off death row.  
Gershowitz’s article, therefore, affords a window into the 
increasing use of predictive analytics in deciding whether to bring 
or resolve litigation. Sifting through data on all prior capital cases 
can yield clues as to the likelihood of success or the length of 
litigation in future capital cases. Not surprisingly, the past can, to 
some extent, help us predict the future and thereby inform the 
governor’s commutation decision.  
Deployment of predictive analytics is more familiar in the 
private sector. The life insurance industry historically is 
predicated on actuarial science, and credit card companies rely on 
complex data to score riskiness of a loan or to detect fraud. Even 
sports teams follow a “Moneyball” approach to drafting and 
acquiring the best talent possible based on prior data.  
Gershowitz’s article presages the role that predictive analytics 
will play in the public sector, saving vast resources and limiting 
subjectivity in governmental decision-making. Reliance on prior 
data can help determine when the government should settle torts 
cases, pay Veterans claims, and subject those receiving disability 
to review to determine if their disability continues. Predictive 
analytics may also help the IRS streamline tax auditing and 
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collection. On the other hand, unlike in private law, individuated 
decision-making may be required by the government either under 
the Constitution or legislative directives. Moreover, the 
government’s consideration of historical factors correlated with 
protected categories such as race may result, on occasion, in 
discrimination when reliance on the prior data culminates in 
denial of a benefit or increased punishment. As with any other 
technological breakthrough, predictive analytics as applied to the 
public sector brings tremendous promise but concerns as well. 
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Introduction 
Adam Gershowitz’s article calling for post-trial plea 
bargaining in capital cases persuasively argues that the costs of 
protracted post-trial litigation over imposition of the death 
penalty1 can exceed the benefits of such litigation in upholding 
the integrity of the criminal justice system, regardless of one’s 
moral views of the death penalty. Gershowitz relays that states 
are spending millions of dollars in litigation of capital cases that 
do not result in execution of those convicted, either because 
courts overturn the sentence or because the defendants die 
awaiting outcome of the lengthy litigation.2 He argues that, when 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Gershowtiz reports that there is an average of fifteen years between 
sentence and execution. Adam Gershowitz, Post-Trial Plea Bargaining in 
Capital Cases: Using Conditional Clemency to Remove Weak Cases from Death 
Row, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1359, 1361 n.4 (2016). 
 2.  Id. at 1361. 
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indicators arise post-trial that litigation will be arduous and sap 
the resources of state litigators, governors should commute the 
death sentence to life in prison. Gershowitz uses the examples of 
a dissent on a state appellate court panel3 or discrediting of an 
expert who earlier testified at the sentencing phase as signals to 
a governor that subsequent litigation would not be worth the 
cost.4  
Plea bargaining post trial differs in several important 
respects from pre-trial plea bargaining. Principally, if the 
litigation only focuses on the capital sentencing hearing, then the 
defendant almost assuredly will accept a commutation to life in 
prison and, indeed, the Supreme Court in Biddle v. Perovich5 held 
that the individual in such contexts has no choice but to accept 
the commutation, presumably on the ground that the defendant 
cannot insist upon his or her own death.6 So, in much of the 
litigation over capital sentencing, the plea bargain analogy is 
inapt because the defendant is not relinquishing any rights. If the 
litigation instead focuses on the validity of some aspect of the 
conviction for the capital offense, then the analogy holds. The 
defendant’s “chip” in that instance would be to agree to halt the 
ongoing litigation. Depending on risk aversion and likelihood of 
success, a defendant would consent to the commutation in 
exchange for dropping litigation that might result in a lesser 
sentence. From the governor’s perspective, plea bargaining post 
trial differs as well, because a commutation to life in prison 
                                                                                                     
 3.  Id. at 1387. 
 4.  Id. at 1388. 
 5.  274 U.S. 480 (1927). 
 6.  See id. at 488 (“Supposing that Perovich did not accept the change, he 
could not have got himself hanged against the Executive order. Supposing that 
he did accept, he could not affect the judgment to be carried out.”). In 
non-capital contexts, offenders remain free to reject offers of commutation, as 
Oscar Lopez Rivera, a former leader of the FALN—a Puerto Rican terrorist 
organization—demonstrated by rejecting  President Clinton’s offer to commute 
his sentence on the condition that he renounce terrorism. President Obama 
subsequently, and perhaps surprisingly, commuted his sentence without any 
condition. Charles Lane, Forget Chelsea Manning. This is the Obama Pardon 
You Should be Mad About., WASH. POST. (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/forget-chelsea-manning-this-is-the-
obama-pardon-you-should-be-mad-about/2017/01/ 18/1b3c8b6a-ddb0-11e6-ad42-
f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.27ad7e6de5 bf (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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substantially reduces the potential, as in a typical plea bargain 
case, that a light sentence will result in the defendant offending 
again. Nonetheless, as Gershowitz notes, political costs still 
remain because of the potentially adverse public reaction.7 
Yet, despite the imperfect analogy to plea bargaining, 
Gershowitz is correct that governors can use the commutation 
power to preserve litigation resources.8 Gershowitz’s article 
therefore affords a window into the increasing use of predictive 
analytics in deciding whether to bring or resolve litigation. 
Sifting through data on all prior capital cases can yield clues as to 
the likelihood of success or the length of litigation in future 
capital cases. Not surprisingly, the past can, to some extent, help 
us predict the future. Gershowitz’s example of the dissenting 
judge can be calculated nationally in an effort to determine the 
number of years of litigation and ultimate outcome after a dissent 
in a death penalty case.9 Similarly, governors can calculate the 
effect when an expert who testified at a sentencing hearing 
subsequently is discredited. The more factors that can be 
calculated, the more accurate the picture likely will be.10 In the 
pretrial plea bargaining context prosecutors often can assess the 
likelihood of particular sentences based on the evidence they have 
amassed, including age of offender, crime charged, potential 
application of sentencing guidelines and past practices of judges 
before whom they are likely to appear. Reliance on such data will 
minimize the potential for inconsistent plea bargaining decisions 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from prosecutor to 
prosecutor. 
                                                                                                     
 7.  See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 1371–72 (describing how politicians, 
particularly those with presidential aspirations, must maintain a reputation as 
“tough on crime”). In addition, the governor’s frequent use of the commutation 
power might undermine the morale of the state’s litigation team. 
 8.  See id. at 1362 (noting that some states are spending millions of dollars 
in these capital cases). Gershowitz does not factor in the countervailing costs of 
incarceration for life. 
 9.  See id. at 1387 (“So, how would governors know which cases to 
commute? . . . Governors could simply have their legal counsel read and analyze 
the dissenting opinions to see if they find the dissenting opinions convincing.”). 
 10.  Unless the system is too complex, in which relevant factors cannot be 
extracted. See infra Parts I–II (describing the difficulty of determining relevant 
factors in the current system). 
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Deployment of predictive analytics is more familiar in the 
private sector. The life insurance industry historically is 
predicated on actuarial science, and companies today rely on data 
harvested from their files recording what type of car was involved 
in a crash, how old were the drivers and passengers, what type of 
injury was reported, the jurisdiction in which the crash took place 
and so on to determine whether to settle and if so how much to 
offer. Bank and credit card companies rely on complex data to 
score riskiness of a loan or to detect fraud. Marketing firms mine 
date and look for patterns to predict the purchasing behavior of 
consumers. Indeed, “Moneyball” has captured the attention of the 
public.11 Reliance on such data can be cost effective, while 
limiting subjectivity of the decision-maker. 
Predictive analytics is also a familiar, if not fully examined, 
part of our national security strategy. Surveillance is predicated 
on the possibility that individuals who visit particular locales, 
call certain phone numbers and/or visit certain websites pose a 
risk to public safety. The No-Fly List is based on similar 
analytics.12 Predictive policing aims analogously to prevent 
crimes before they happen.13  
                                                                                                     
 11.  Ken Krogue, Brad Pitt, Oakland Athletics, and Moneyball: Still the 
Model for Change Management, Business Transformation and Predictive 
Analytics, FORBES (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenkrogue/2014/07/15/brad-pitt-oakland-athletics-
and-moneyball-still-the-model-for-change-management-business-
transformation-and-predictive-analytics/#620f36ac1753 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael Schrage, 
What a Minor League Moneyball Can Teach about Predictive Analytics, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (May 26, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/what-a-minor-league-
moneyball-reveals-about-predictive-analytics (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12.  See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, No-Fly List Uses Predictive Assessments, 
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/no-fly_list_use.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2017) (noting that the U.S. government has admitted to its use of 
predictive assessments when deciding whether an individual should be on the 
no-fly list) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13.  See, e.g., Mara Hvistendahl, Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent Crime 
Before it Happens?, SCIENCE (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crime-
it-happens (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (describing how the new “predictive 
policing” program will use police car laptops to “display maps showing locations 
where crime is likely to occur, based on data-crunching algorithms developed by 
scientists . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Gershowitz’s article presages the role that predictive 
analytics will play in more routine public sector contexts. In the 
pages that follow, I take tentative steps to chart the conditions 
under which the use of predictive analytics should be encouraged 
in public law.14 As with any other technological breakthrough, 
predictive analytics as applied to legal decision-making brings 
tremendous promise but some concerns as well. 
I. Sufficiency of Data 
As the concept of quantitative legal prediction itself suggests, 
predictive analytics cannot work without sufficient information. 
For the No-Fly List, the data sifted was, reportedly, enormous,15 
and the data set for predictive policing is also robust.16 Tax 
authorities can probe millions of records to create an algorithm to 
detect tax avoidance schemes. Consider, as well, a leading article 
that focuses on securities fraud litigation in the federal courts, 
assessing a variety of factors to determine the likelihood that a 
case will settle and the amount of that settlement.17 The 
researchers examined 1200 cases and inputted data based on 
identity of the parties, the defendant’s stock market performance, 
the circuit in which the case was filed, and the nature of the 
alleged wrongdoing, among other factors. The twelve hundred 
cases assured a significant enough data set to make successful 
prediction. The algorithm cannot function if the data points are 
too disparate. Certainly, the approximately 8,000 death sentences 
cited by Gershowitz present sufficient data from which to draw 
                                                                                                     
 14.  For a more sophisticated assessment in the legal services sector, see 
generally Daniel M. Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction–Or—How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal 
Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013) (discussing the various 
technological advances that may push the legal services sector towards data 
driven analysis). 
 15. Schneier, supra note 12. 
 16. See Hvistendahl, supra note 13 (“[P]olice departments were catching up 
in data collection, making crime forecasting a ‘real possibility rather than just a 
theoretical novelty,’ . . . .”). . 
 17.  See generally Blakeley B. McShane, Oliver Watson, Tom Baker and 
Sean Griffith, Predicting Securities Fraud Settlements and Amounts: A 
Hierarchical Bayesian Model of Federal Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 482 (2012). 
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factors such as duration of litigation and ultimate outcome.18 Of 
the 8,000 individuals sentenced to death, Gershowtiz reports that 
less than twenty percent have been executed.19 
 On the other hand, there may be insufficient instances in 
the post-trial death sentence context in which an expert is 
disqualified or state appellate judge dissents to create a 
meaningful information set. The available data may not permit a 
governor to make a cost-benefit analysis of when to commute a 
death sentence in light of a prediction of litigation costs. 
Predictions do not work if the data points are too isolated. In 
contrast, insurance companies considering whether to settle cases 
arising out of car crashes have a cornucopia of information on 
which to rely, as do banks in considering whether to make a loan. 
Predictive analytics depends on sufficient data.  
II. Relevance of Data Studied 
Before 2016, every time that the National League won the 
seventh game of a World Series in a presidential election year, a 
Democrat was elected to the White House.20 That being said, 
election campaigns would be foolish to rely on such data in 
campaigning. Many correlations exist that may not be predictive. 
Although the relevance of data may not be apparent from the 
outset, decision-makers must be able to focus on relevant data to 
make predictive analytics valuable.  
One way to check against the use of irrelevant data in either 
public or private law is to ensure that the predictive analytics are 
constantly updated. Over time, relevant data likely will come to 
the fore. In the securities fraud litigation example, most, but not 
all, factors studied had predictive value,21 while a study of social 
                                                                                                     
 18.  Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 1370–71. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Sports Indicators of Election Favor Hillary Clinton, But. . . , POSTGAME, 
(Nov. 6, 2016), www.thepostgame.com/presidential-election-world-series-game-
7-redskins (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). At least that was true until the Cubs’ recent stirring victory. 
 21.  See generally McShane, supra note 17, at 499–501; see also Daniel M. 
Katz, Michael Bommarito & Josh Blackman, Predicting the Behavior of the 
United States Supreme Court: A General Approach 4–5 (Jan. 16, 2017) (on file 
with authors), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.03473.pdf. 
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security disability litigation in federal courts concluded that 
almost none of the many factors studied was salient.22 
Moreover, some systems may be too complex to permit 
isolation of relevant data. We may not have developed the tools to 
select the variables that have predictive value in such complex 
systems. For instance, weather more than ten days out remains 
an enigma despite the best efforts of meteorologists.23 
Post-trial plea bargaining takes place within a criminal 
justice system that comparatively is simple enough to permit 
drawing relevant data, and the factors of a dissenting judge and 
discredited expert are likely salient. Gershowitz notes in addition 
that litigation over capital sentencing has changed significantly 
over the past generation.24 Only a constantly updating model will 
ensure that relevant factors are assessed. Unlike with long-term 
predictions about the weather, prior data should be relevant for 
predicting when best to plea bargain pre or post trial. For 
predictive analytics to succeed, we must be able to extract 
sufficient relevant data from the information available.25 
Finally, to some extent, relevant data can only be ascertained 
if a baseline of accuracy exists so that a decision-maker can 
determine whether analytics based on the relevant factors lead to 
a sound prediction. With weather, we can measure success by 
comparing weather conditions to what was predicted based on 
different models; with life insurance companies, it is a simple 
matter to determine whether their risk assessment panned out. 
In public law contexts, however, it may be more difficult to agree 
on a benchmark because the political costs of agreeing to 
                                                                                                     
 22.  See generally Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Inconsistency and Angst 
in District Court Resolution of Social Security Disability Appeals, 67 HASTINGS 
L. J. 367 (2016). 
 23.  See Katz, supra note 14, at 959–61 (“Even under fairly ideal conditions, 
weather is a hard prediction problem and our best success is obtained within 
small time windows around the given event.”). 
 24.  See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 1363 n.15, 1366 n.27 (noting some of 
the specific ways the litigation has changed).  
 25. Supposedly, one of the failures of the Total Information Awareness 
project launched by Admiral Poindexter after 9/11 was the difficulty in 
identifying relevant data. Q&A on the Pentagon’s “Total Information Awareness” 
Program, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/qa-pentagons-total-information-
awareness-program?redirect=cpredirect/15578 (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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sentences less than those approved by the jury or sentencing 
judge are so hard to measure. Moreover, in the context of 
post-trial plea bargaining, as in all settlements, the 
decision-maker never is sure what would have happened had the 
bargain not taken place.26 At a minimum, however, greater 
consistency in decision-making can be assured, and a governor 
can assess over time the extent to which litigation costs have 
lessened.  
 III. No Right to an Individualized Determination 
Although algorithms can be fashioned to create insurance 
markets and help with litigation costs, use of probabilistic data to 
assess eligibility for government benefits or leniency programs 
may be problematic.  
For example, roughly two million applications for social 
security disability are filed each year. The agency must 
determine if each applicant is disabled based on a complicated 
grid that focuses on the applicant’s continuing ability to perform 
gainful employment in the economy.27 The agency must consider 
age, physical and psychological symptoms, interactivity of 
symptoms, employment history and so forth. Assessing whether 
an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social 
Security Act is time consuming, expensive, and has led to widely 
disparate decisions across the country.28 How attractive it would 
be instead to cull information from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) or the National Institutes of Health to 
create an algorithm to determine the likelihood that someone 
with similar conditions and age can pursue gainful employment 
                                                                                                     
 26.  See Daniel Kahneman et al., Noise: How to Overcome the High, Hidden 
Cost of Inconsistent Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/10/noise (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (discussing generally, not 
just in the legal context, how irrelevant information must be limited to produce 
decisions without wrong results) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 27. HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 1–3 (Apr. 3, 2013), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achieving_Greater_Consisten
cy_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf. 
 28.  Id. at 14–33. 
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despite the setback(s). The algorithm could be tested on prior 
cases to determine whether it predicts disability effectively as 
measured by the rubrics established by the agency, or it could be 
tested against the assessment of experts. If the algorithm could 
predict disability with a ninety percent success rate, massive 
amounts of time and resources would be saved,29 and greater 
consistency would be ensured. As it is, those who are denied 
disability can seek a de novo hearing before an Administrative 
Law Judge, and 800,000 do so every year with a forty percent or 
so success rate.30 In comparison, determining disability with a 
ninety percent success rate at the outset would be outstanding. 
But Congress has not directed that individuals be awarded 
disability on a probabilistic basis. Rather, the agency is to assess 
the particular characteristics and conditions of each claimant.31 
Predictive analytics cannot be the sole basis for a judgment when 
individualized determinations are required by law.  
Use of predictive analytics to fast track eligibility poses a 
closer question⎯individuals receiving such benefits due to the 
algorithm would be advantaged in receiving benefits more quickly 
than others. When the algorithm did not predict disability, the 
claimant still would have the same opportunity as now to 
demonstrate disability before the agency through a written 
hearing, with presumably less wait time. Unless Congress were 
to direct that the agency assess disability on a first come first 
served basis, such fast tracking in the long run would save 
tremendous resources. Deployment of a probabilistic algorithm to 
determine disability is promising. 
 Consider, as well, if the agency used predictive analytics to 
determine which recipients of disability payments likely were to 
improve medically to the point where they could resume gainful 
                                                                                                     
 29.  An avenue of appeal would be available for those denied disability 
based on the algorithm and, presumably the appeals system would correct—to 
the extent consistent with prior practice—the error. Those erroneously granted 
disability might well lose disability through the Continuing Disability Review 
(CDR) process. Infra note 31. 
 30.  Krent & Morris, supra note 22, at 14–23. 
 31.  Due Process may mandate individuated treatment even if the 
legislature has not so directed. Criminal defendants, for instance, could not be 
convicted based on probabilistic notions alone; nor would Matthews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319 (1976), permit dismissal of a governmental employee without a 
hearing based on factors specific to the particular case. 
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employment. The agency might single out those for Continuing 
Disability Review based on predictive data. Those selected for a 
hearing because of the algorithm thus would be more likely to 
lose disability earlier than others who had received disability at 
the same time. The agency follows a simplified form of this 
approach currently,32 and a more sophisticated approach would 
be entirely consistent with the statutory scheme because the 
ultimate determination of disability would turn on the 
characteristics of the particular claimant.33  
Use of predictive analytics in the post-trial plea bargaining 
context similarly would not prove problematic. Each individual 
has been sentenced based, at least in part, on his or her own 
conduct. To be sure, many defendants would receive the offer of a 
commutation based on factors external to their criminal conduct. 
Plea bargaining before trial itself, however, is based on factors 
unrelated to blameworthiness, such as the expense of 
prosecution, difficulty of obtaining evidence, and so forth.34 
Moreover, with the exception of the commutation from the death 
penalty when only the capital sentencing is challenged, the 
offender can refuse the offer. 
IV. Potential for Discrimination 
Even when individualized treatment is not mandated by the 
legislature, the use of predictive algorithms may result in 
                                                                                                     
 32.  The agency currently classifies beneficiaries into three categories— 
medical improvement not expected, medical improvement possible, and medical 
improvement expected—based on 1990s data and then prioritizes within the 
third category for full medical reviews. For an analysis of deficiencies in the 
acquisition and analysis of data, see Alexandra Constantin, et al., Data-Driven 
Solutions for Improving the Continuing Disability Review Process, in IDEAS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 142–50 
(2016) [hereinafter IDEAS TO STRENGTHEN]. 
 33.  Congress could also fashion a transitional term of disability for those 
who are most likely to improve medically based on probabilistic data. See, e.g., 
Kim Hildred, Pamela Mazerski, Harold J. Krent & Jennifer Christian, 
Transitional Benefits for a Subset of the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Population, in IDEAS TO STRENGTHEN, supra note 32, at 337. 
 34.  Because of the focus on external factors, the potential for 
discrimination arises, although there have been no studies, of which I am 
aware, suggesting that plea bargaining has resulted in discrimination. See also 
infra notes 37–38 (addressing subjectivity in the clemency context). 
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discrimination against an individual, in essence disadvantaging 
him or her for being a member of a group. When the state bases 
predictive analytics on data correlated with gender, race, or other 
protected category, discrimination can occur. 
A case in point lies in the evidence-based sentencing adopted 
by over twenty states.35 That approach relies in part on data 
drawn from factors extrinsic to the individual’s conduct, such as 
socioeconomic status and level of education, to estimate the 
chance of recidivism. To the extent such factors are linked with 
race, so will the predicted level of recidivism even when the prior 
conduct viewed in isolation does not so indicate. In other words, 
predictive data can “bake in” discrimination due to reliance on 
factors outside the individual’s own past conduct, and judges may 
use such factors without realizing that they are thereby 
departing from a sentencing system based on moral dessert. 
Viewed another way, probabilities based on factors outside the 
individual’s control can result in discrimination, even though 
subjective factors also may be determinative in the recidivism 
decisions reached by judges without the benefit of data. The risks 
of each must be considered in designing how best to reach 
recidivism predictions. 
Indeed, ProPublica recently released a study of risk 
assessment for recidivism assigned to 7,000 people arrested in 
Broward County, Florida, in 2013–14.36 The data revealed that 
race played a substantial factor in the recidivism projection, 
which then led to longer sentences for African Americans who 
committed similar offenses to whites. ProPublica tentatively 
concluded that the questions Florida law enforcement authorities 
asked about socio-economic and demographic conditions, such as 
whether a parent had been in jail or the number of people known 
to have used illegal drugs, play a substantial role in the sentences 
handed out. The study highlights the importance of 
transparency⎯the factors underlying predictive analytics can 
                                                                                                     
 35.  See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014) (examining 
the effects of evidence based sentencing). 
 36. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
www.propublic.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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shape the prediction and should in public law contexts be shared 
with the public when possible.37 Although there has been no 
similar study of the net cast by the No-Fly List, few would be 
surprised if the list disproportionately targeted those with Middle 
Eastern backgrounds in comparison to others who posed a similar 
risk of violence based solely on their prior actions. 
In the commutation context, subjective factors could 
conceivably result in discrimination. After all, the President’s 
pardon power embraces discretion, and has so historically.38 
Discrimination based on race, gender, and other characteristics 
likely has entered into the calculus—even President Lincoln 
allegedly showed favoritism to residents of Kentucky.39 But, in 
calling for greater use of the commutation power in death penalty 
cases, Gershowitz confines his analysis to situations in which 
litigation costs would be substantial, a relatively neutral criterion 
that is not likely to lead to discrimination. 
Conclusion 
Utilization of predictive analytics will burgeon with time. 
The benefits of quantitative legal prediction are many, and the 
potential savings to government bureaucracy and private 
business alike, huge. Governments as well as private businesses 
should be able to learn from the sine qua non of the insurance 
industry⎯data from the past can be mined to predict the future, 
                                                                                                     
 37.  The furor over the factors that led to placing individuals on the “no-fly 
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factors, but disclosure of some might tip off potential terrorists. See, e.g., 
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are Americans, WASH. TIMES (June 20, 2016), 
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names-fewer-1k-us/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 38.  See, e.g., HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 189–94 (2005) 
(summarizing how presidents have granted clemency for different reasons). 
 39. Id. at 203; see also Lois Beckett & Robin Respaut, Racial Disparity in 
Presidential Pardons: What Can Be Done?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2011), 
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and subjectivity in decision-making, minimized. As long as there 
is sufficient relevant data, predictive analytics can help 
government decision-makers allocate scarce resources, as 
Gershowitz recommends, even though there may be insufficient 
data in the death penalty context he addresses. 
That being said, two cautionary notes are appropriate in 
deploying predictive analytics in public law. Individuated 
decision-making may be required either under the Constitution 
or pertinent laws, thus preventing reliance on predictive 
analytics, even where it would be fiscally prudent to do so. 
Second, even where reliance on external data seems appropriate, 
consideration of those factors may result in discrimination. Thus, 
government actors must be careful if relying on characteristics 
more prevalent among protected groups than others when 
making predictions affecting individual rights. After all, 
predictive analytics is just a technologically more sophisticated 
way of describing profiling. 
 
